

Approved For Release 2001/11/20 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002200040015-9

MEMORANDUM FOR: *R SI*

*Yes. This was checked
out in an earlier draft with
the OSR people concerned.*

*[REDACTED] cleared it
with Bruce - who left the answer
pretty much up to SR/PL. We see
no problem with it.*

27 Sep 67

(DATE)

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE	2001/11/20 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002200040015-9
TO:		9/22/67	
D/SR			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING		
3F30	HQ		
REMARKS:			
<p>Ch/SR/PL - [REDACTED]</p> <p>Are you or your people familiar with this? If so, please fill me in - but don't do anything formally - please return</p> <p>FROM: O/DD/I [REDACTED] memo to me</p>			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION	
7E			
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STATINTL

STATINTL

SECRET

Hold: IRAG

22 SEP 1967

↑
Linda

MEMORANDUM FOR: CIA Member, Critical Collection Problems Committee

SUBJECT : Classification of Major US Intelligence Objectives

REFERENCE : Memorandum from CIA Member, CCPC to DD/LAS dated 19 September 1967, same subject

1. In response to your request we have examined the CCPC Classification of Major US Intelligence Objectives.

2. I attach recommended changes in Section 100 (Military) with supporting explanations. These recommendations derive from our view that the list is meant to deal with the current time frame; a list projecting the threat to the period of the 1970's would have somewhat different priorities.

3. I cannot give Directorate of Intelligence approval to the list unless special consideration is given to North Vietnam, which is currently lumped with "other Communist countries" and yet is of major if not critical concern to the United States in most of the categories covered. I would suggest that North Vietnam--and perhaps North Korea--be given separate treatment, although one or both might be taken together with Communist China under a "Far East Communist Countries" heading.

4. Where lower priorities are assigned to critical developments because of their relative improbability, e.g., in Categories 110, 122, 160, 180, 240, 260, etc., an asterisk should so indicate. Likewise, some of the sections are not applicable to some of the areas, and this should be indicated.

Signed

EDWARD W. PROCTOR
Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachment: s/s

SECRET

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - CIA Member, CCPC w/a

1 - D/CI w/a

1 - D/EA w/a

1 - D/ECGI w/a

1 - D/SR w/a

1 - [REDACTED] w/a

1 - [REDACTED] w/a

2 - [REDACTED] w/a

DDI/IRS: [REDACTED]/rr (9/22/67) x6614

Retyped: O/NO/ [REDACTED]/rr (9/22/67)

ATTACHMENT

100-Military

120--Strategic military forces

122--Surface-to-surface missiles of inter-continental range.

Change: Communist China from I to II

Reason: The threat is not now present, therefore, Category II "major importance" is more appropriate than "critical to US national survival".

124--Missile submarines and associated missile systems.

Change: Communist China from I to II

Reason: Generally same as above--present threat is not "critical to US national survival".

130--General purpose forces

132--Naval forces.

133--Air forces.

Change: For both items change USSR from III to II

Reason: Ranking of priority should be comparable with ground forces--all items under Category 130 are of major importance as applied to the Soviet Union. Soviet deployments and possible base rights outside the Bloc are of greatest concern.

140--Capabilities, intentions and efforts to undertake military movements or provocations such as to threaten international peace.

Change: USSR and Communist China from III to II

Reason: Possible military movements in areas like SEA, the Middle East and South Asia by either country is of major importance to the U.S.

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180-- Nuclear testing activities, especially any indication of intent to conduct tests prohibited under the Test Ban Treaty.

Change: Communist China from III to II

Reason: Chinese nuclear developments are now and will continue to be of major importance to US national security or national interests because of the rapid Chinese developments in the field and the possible use of this capability to effect the peripheral areas.